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ABSTRACT 
By investigating the phenomenon of corruption, we found that corruption represents a huge 
cost on society. There exists extensive theory and literature on the costs of corruption, but 
costs on firm-level has been limited.  Because of this, we wanted to expand this literature by 
looking at how a country`s level of corruption would affect a firms stock price reaction 
resulting from news about corruption. 
With a manual collection process we identified 71 individual corruption cases from six 
countries within the time period from April 2010 to April 2015. Using the standard event 
study methodology, we found a significant negative stock market reaction to the news about a 
firm participating in corrupt actvities. For our sample as a whole, the cumulative average 
abnormal return was -1.68% in the 7 days surrounding the event day. By doing a comparison 
between firms from more corrupt countries and firms from less corrupt countries, we did not 
find any evidence to say that the former should experience a more negative reaction on stock 
price than the latter 
In addition, our findings show that the size of the cumulative abnormal return resulting from 
news about corruption is positively influenced by the size of the firm. We also found evidence 
of an interaction effect, where an increasing price-book ratio will positively moderate the 
effect of the level of corruption. This indicates that a higher price-book ratio is beneficial in 
more corrupt countries. 
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1 Introduction 
In March 2014, the former Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa was arrested for money 
laundering. His testimony would later be essential to expose the largest corruption scandal 
Brazil had ever seen. Executives from the state-controlled oil company Petrobras and different 
construction companies had worked with Brazilian politicians on a two billion USD kickback 
scheme from 2004 to 2012. The construction companies bought contracts from Petrobras and 
charged an add-on, which then was divided not only between Petrobras executives and the 
construction companies, but also to Brazilian politicians. So what happened to the Petrobras 
stock after the revelation of this corruption scandal? After falling for four months prior to the 
announcement, it now doubled within six months. This rather unexpected reaction awaked our 
interest of how the financial markets are affected and react to corruption. 
A World Bank-report released in 2005 attempted to get a dollar value on corruption 
(Kaufmann, 2005).  They estimated a total cost of corruption ranging between $600 billion to 
$1.5 trillion. Another estimate done by Transparency International argued that the number 
could be as high as $2.6 trillion. This is equal to more than 5% of the global gross domestic 
product (Transparency International, 2007). In addition they also estimated that in developing 
countries alone, the dollar value of bribes paid to corrupt officials is close to $40 billion each 
year, and that 40 % of business executives has been approached and requested to pay a bribe 
when dealing with a public institution. (Transparency International, 2009). Not only is 
corruption the largest obstacle to economic and social development, it accounts for a too large 
part of the world economy to be overlooked (The World Bank, 2013). 
That corruption is costly is supported by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who describe 
corruption as “sand in the wheels” of an economy. They argue that corruption can lead to high 
economic costs due to support given to inefficient producers and the allocation of resources 
away from their most productive usage (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993). Others like 
Nathaniel Leff (1964) and Samuel Huntington (1968) however say that corruption in some 
cases may work as an important mechanism in overcentralized bureaucracy, and act as a 
substitution for bad law. In other words, they argue that corruption may work as a ”greasing” 
mechanism, where there is economic value in terms of the additional productive transactions 
which occur on micro-level. They thus believe that these benefits may exceed the cost of 
engaging in corruption (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). 
 ___________________________________________________________________________  
 5 
Even so, research has shown that corruption have negative effects on various economic 
factors like GDP growth (Mauro, 1995), Foreign Direct Investment (Wei, 2000; Smarzynska 
& Wei, 2000; Abed & Gupta, 2002) and capital productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003). While the 
literature on the country-level effects of corruption is well researched and has been a topic of 
interest for decades, the focus on more firm-specific effects has been lower. However, in the 
last years the amount of studies examining the effect of corruption on this level has grown. 
Many of the recent studies on firm level has been done by implementing the event study 
methodology to measure the stock markets reactions to news about corrupt activities1. 
The overall focus on these event studies has been to examine how the stock markets are 
reacting to news about corruption, and the results are showing significant negative reactions 
in a majority of the studies through various countries. A study done by Karpoff, Lee and 
Martin (2014) found a negative stock price reaction to news about corruption in US firms, and 
a similar study done by Sun and Zhang (2006) found negative reactions when looking at 
Chinese firms. Even though the different studies use similar methodology, comparing the 
results can be difficult. They investigate the reaction in different time periods, have different 
assumptions and it can be hard to argue that the stock price reaction would be the same way 
pre- and post the financial crisis. In addition they both used within-country samples, which 
means that the results only can be generalized to the respective samples. Investigating 
potential differences between how the markets react to these type of news, may be of 
importance to further expand our understanding of how the financial markets operate and 
broaden the theory on financial reactions to information. 
In terms of comparing how the reaction to corruption would differ between countries, one 
could expect the level of corruption in the country to either amplify or diminish the original 
reaction. On one side, a firm from a more corrupt country is proven to be more likely to 
partake in corruption (Transparency International, 2009). This means that this risk should be 
reflected in a lower stock price. Following this logic one would expect a weaker reaction to 
the news of a firm being corrupt, since the risk should already be reflected in the stock price. 
On the other side, one could expect investors to be more likely to see one isolated act of 
corruption as a signal for larger underlying corruption culture, and thus amplify the reaction, 
if firms come from a more corrupt country (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1998). 
                                                 
1 Some examples are: Rao,1997; Gunthrope, 1997; Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2004; Chen, Ding, & Kim, 
2010. 
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We found these mechanisms interesting and sought out to examine this further. The purpose 
of this study if to examine if firms from countries characterized as more corrupt, will 
experience a modified reaction compared to firms from countries which are seen as less 
corrupt. To do this, we first want to use the event study methodology to see if our sample 
displays the same reactions to corruption as predicted by previous studies and economic 
theory.  
Furthermore we want to investigate whether markets exhibit different reactions to news about 
firms being corrupt in countries with different general level of corruption. This will be done 
by using variation in the different countries corruption levels, to check if there is systematic 
differences in the stock price reaction between the countries.  
At last, we want to explore if there are any other firm specific characteristics which possibly 
could influence the effect of the country`s level of corruption. Some studies has shown that 
the market capitalization of the firm could diminish the effect of the news about corruption 
and other studies has shown that the sector in which the firm operates also could be of 
importance. By using OLS-regression, we thus also want to explore if firm characteristics like 
these could impact the effect of the country`s level of corruption. We chose to focus on size in 
form of market capitalization, the capital intensity of the sector and the price-book ratio of the 
firm. 
Our dataset originally consisted of 129 different companies from six countries which had 
been caught participating in corrupt activities between April 2010 and May 2015. By 
implementing a strict set of selection criteria’s we reduced the size of our sample down to 71 
firms. This study will contribute to the existing event study literature in terms of using an up-
to-date data sample, and investigating possible differences in stock price reactions based on 
the level of corruption in the selected countries. In addition, it would complement and 
broaden economic theory in regards of how the financial markets react to negative news. 
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2 Theory and Hypothesis: 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The most important underlying theory in event studies, is the proposition of efficient markets. 
The efficient market hypothesis states that an assets current price should fully reflect all the 
information that is available at the time. This means that the only time an asset price will 
change is when new information becomes available to the market. Since the inflow of new 
information in capital markets are unpredictable, this implies that no one should be able to 
consistently outperform the market, given that one has the same information available and the 
factor of luck is removed.  
The efficient market hypothesis was first developed in the early 1900s, but it was not until 
Eugene Fama (1970) provided empirical evidence that the theory became widely accepted. He 
stated that there were three different forms of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong and strong 
form (Fama, 1970). In the weak form of market efficiency, prices only reflect information, 
which are possible to extract from historical prices and returns. This implies that trend 
analysis is useless in order to earn abnormal returns, since the benefit of analyzing historical 
returns already should be reflected in the stock.  
The semi-strong form of efficiency states that in addition to historical data, all publicly 
available information regarding the firm’s current and future prospects is reflected in the stock 
price. The strong form of market efficiency states that stock prices should reflect absolutely 
all information available about the firm. This includes historical prices, public information 
and insider-information. This form of efficiency is considered to be extreme, and should not 
be treated as anything else than a benchmark and a logical completion of possible forms of the 
efficient market hypothesis.  
In our study we have assumed that the semi-strong form of market efficiency represents the 
information availability. By this assumption we propose that the market does not know that a 
firm has participated in corruption,  and thus that the stock price does not reflect this 
information. By using the event study methodology, we aim to quantify the market reaction 
when this information about corrupt activities becomes publically available. 
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2.2 Corruption as a Phenomenon  
A commonly used definition of corruption is “the abuse of public power for private benefits” 
(The World Bank, 1997). This definition focus on the public sector, but as Rose-Ackerman 
(1998) pointed out, corruption also exists in the interface between the public and private 
sector. Norad, which is using the Worlds Bank definition, provides an extended definition but 
adds; “It applies to any transaction between the public and the private sectors where public 
goods are illegally converted into private benefits” (NORAD, 2013). Norad’s definition 
includes the most important aspects of corruption, but it still relies on participation from the 
public sector. Therefore, we will use Transparency International’s definition of corruption 
“the abuse of entrusted power for private gains” (Transparency International, 2015). Not 
only is it a more cited definition (Ng D., 2006) (Kaufmann, 2005), it also opens for corruption 
in the private sector without public participation. 
A further interpretation of Transparency International’s definition of corruption can be seen as 
the principal-agent-problem (Bardhan, 1997). This occurs when “a person or entity (agent) is 
able to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity (principal)” 
(Shailer, 2004). An example will be managers (agents) that are paid to make the best 
decisions for the shareholders (principals). However, the managers might abuse its entrusted 
power and act opportunistic for private gain, and the principal-agent problem occurs. This can 
happen since the manager has more information (asymmetric information) about the firm than 
the shareholders, and the shareholders have to trust the manager. In this study we will use the 
principal-agent problem as an analytical tool to help clarify corruption as a phenomenon, and 
keep in mind that not all forms of principal-agent problems can be seen as corruption.  
The act of corruption can be carried out in a vast variety of ways, and even though Andvig 
and Fjeldstad (2001) suggest to divide corruption into five forms: bribery, fraud, 
embezzlement, extortion and favoritism, we have chosen to focus on bribery as the corrupt 
act in this study. The reasoning for this is that the action of either paying or receiving a bribe 
should be understood as the essence of what corruption really is (Amundsen, 1999). However, 
we also include some prevoius studies which has defined both bribery and fraud as the act of 
corruption. In many cases, bribery and fraud are partly overlapping or temporarily 
interchangeable with eachother (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). This suggests that studies which 
has defined corruption as both bribery and fraud can contribute to the discussion of the effects 
of corruption, even though we focus only on bribery as the act of corruption. A short 
explanation of fraud will thus be included. The three other forms of corruption suggested by 
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Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) will not be examined in this study since embezzlement from a 
legal perspective is regarded as theft, and extortion and favoritism are most common in the 
public sector (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). This study will therefore mainly examine bribery. 
Bribery can be defined as “giving or receiving a financial or other advantage in connection 
with the “improper performance” of a position of trust, or a function that is expected to be 
performed impartially or in good faith” (Lord, 2014). A financial advantage could include 
“kickbacks, gratitude, commercial arrangements, backsheesh, sweeteners, pay-offs or grease 
money” (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Other advantages could take the form as gifts, lavish 
treatment during business trips or tickets to special events (Lord, 2014). Another definition of 
bribery by Vargas and Hernandez (1999) is “A bribe is made when an official is offered or 
promised a payment for an action already carried out or is to be expected” (Vargas-
Hernández, 1999). This payment could take form in different ways, either as a fixed sum, a 
percentage of a contract or as a favor. Both definitions have in common that the receiver 
usually is an empowered official or person who can negotiate contracts on behalf of either the 
public sector, private enterprises or in any other way can redistribute benefits so that it gains 
individuals or companies.  
When the main point of the bribe is to exchange monetary or non-monetary value for 
favorable treatment, fraud is the use of misleading information (trickery, swindle or deceit) to 
induce someone to turn over property or resources voluntarily. This is an act, which involves 
“a manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise, by public officials positioned 
between politicians and citizens, who seeks to draw a private profit” (Andvig, 2001). 
2.3 Cost of corruption  
It has been done extensive research on the negative effects of corruption, and the results are 
widely acknowledged in economic literature. Mauro (1995) showed that corruption has a 
negative impact on the level of investment and economic growth, and according to his results, 
countries with high levels of corruption experience significantly lower investment rates.  
It has also been done comprehensive research on the effect of corruption and foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Studies done by Wei (2000) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) shows that 
corruption might act like a tax, which deters FDI. Abed and Gupta (2002) further found that 
corruption significantly reduces the level of FDI inflows. In particular FDI to sophisticated 
technology suffer from corruption. This is mainly because investors fear that the 
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technological know-how can be leaked to competitors or the public by opportunistic and 
corrupt partners (Mauro, 1995). 
Furthermore, corruption has been proven to have a significant negative impact on a country’s 
capital productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003). The impact of corruption on the level of per capita 
GDP has also been extensively analyzed. All of these rapports point to a significant negative 
relationship between corruption and the level of economic development (Ehrlich & Lui, 1999; 
Welsh, 2004; Neeman, Paserman, & Simhon, 2008).  
In addition to all these costs to the country`s economy, corruption also imposes various losses 
on a firm level. Some of these costs can be explained by the principal-agent problem, and the 
lower amount of trust to firms in more corrupt countries (Wei, 2000; Becker et al. 2011). To 
decrease the principal-agent problem, corporations are controlled and directed by different 
mechanisms, processes and relations (Shailer, 2004). The set of these mechanisms, processes 
and relations make up the term corporate governance. Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny (1998) found evidence for higher corruption leads to increased agency problems and 
decreased regulatory oversight, since the opportunistic agent will benefit from making 
monitoring and controlling more difficult. A consequence of this is less efficient firms, lower 
firm profitability and lower investor protection (Porta et al., 1998). Ng, Qian and Dix (2008) 
support these findings and document that higher corruption is associated with worse corporate 
governance.  
2.4 Hypothesis 
When corporate governance is weaker and the credibility to the judicial system and legal 
enforcement is low, opportunistic activities become more likely and a consequence of this is 
decreased trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Uslaner, 2004). Trust has always been a 
fundamental factor for efficient financial markets as described by Fama (1970). Since the 
semi-strong form of market efficiency indicates that insider information is not available, 
investors have to rely on the information provided by the firm. If an investor (principal) don’t 
trust the other part (agent) to honor its commitment and repay the investor, there will be no 
transaction, or the investor will demand a compensation for this risk. In the 2008 financial 
crises, this assurance was removed from the financial markets and led to falling stock prices 
and rocketing bond spreads (Guiso, 2010). Even though this example is not directly 
transferable to our study, it shows how important trust is in the financial markets. From this, 
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one would expect that firms being caught in corruption would experience falling stock prices, 
not only due to the direct costs (fees, legal costs etc.), but also due to the loss of credibility. 
Various event studies have been conducted, and even though the evidence vary, we find  
proof for of a significant negative stock price reaction to news about a firm being corrupt. 
Karpoff et al (2014) examine all the 143 US firms caught for breaking the anti-bribery law 
“The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977” (FCPA) from 1978 until 2013, and find that 
firms experience a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of -1.72% in the three days 
surrounding the day this information becomes publically available (event day). Rao (1997) 
find a much stronger stock market reaction when looking at only 16 US bribery cases between 
1989 and 1993.  He finds that firms on average show an abnormal return of -5.72% (Rao, 
1997) on the event day. Studies from outside the US also show similar results. Arnold and 
Engelen (2007) find 57 corruption cases in Holland and Belgium in the period from 1994 to 
2003, and by using the standard event study methodology they show that firms experience a 
CAAR of -1.77% for the three days surrounding the event day. A study of 155 Chinese firms 
caught in corruption between 1990 and 2002 share similar results with a CAAR of -1.4% in 
the three days sorrounding the event day (Sun & Zhang, 2006). 
While all the studies above showed statistically significant negative stock market reactions, 
some other studies find no significant results. A study done on 23 Chinese bribery cases 
conducted by Fan, Rui and Zhao (2008) indicates a negative reaction to news about a firm 
participating in corruption. Similarly, a study done by Bocek (2013) indicates the same using 
60 bribery cases from the US. However, none of the results in these studies were significantly 
signifcant. Contrary to the other studies, Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs (2004) find a positive 
reaction to news about bribery with a CAAR of 0.32%. However, this result was also not 
statistically significant.  
All in all, we find it reasonable to expect a negative stock price reaction to the news of a firm 
being corrupt. We believe that this reaction will occur regardless of the firms`s country of 
origin, and we define our first hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 1: News about a firm being corrupt will result in negative cumulative average 
abnormal returns. 
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Even though there seems to be a general effect of news about corruption, it is not clear how 
this reaction could differ between countries. The financial markets in countries with higher 
level of corruption are not only related with lower investor protection (Porta et al., 1998), 
poorer corporate governance (Ng et al. 2008) and less trust (Wei, 2000; Becker et al. 2011), 
but also face more “nervousity” from foreign investors (Pellegrini, Sergi & Sironi, 2015). 
Gelos and Wei (2005) find that during financial downtimes, international funds flee non-
transparent countries by a significant greater amount than their transparent counterparts. Even 
though Gelos and Wei’s (2005) results aren’t directly transfarable to our study, their evidence 
indicates that firms from more corrupt countries might experience greater negative effects 
when trust is lost in the financial markets. Using the analogy to the financial crisis, we can try 
to illustrate this effect. During the financial crises in 2008, the stock market reacted 
significantly stronger to bad news than in the years before and after (Guiso, 2010). This 
indicates that markets with lower credibility amplifies the reaction of bad news. 
One could expect a stronger reaction to firms from more corrupt countries for various reasons. 
Firstly, one could expect that an act of corruption by a firm from a less corrupt country could 
be seen as an exception rather than business as usual. On the other side, an act of corruption 
by a firm from a more corrupt country could indicate a deeper problem, since corruption may 
be seen as a normal way of doing business (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Fisman & 
Miguel, 2007). Furthermore, news about a firm being corrupt can also increase the general 
mistrust to all other information provided by the firm. Chen, Ding, and Kim (2010) show that 
it is harder to estimate future earnings for firms prevously associated with corruption, leading 
to a lower firm valuation. This effect is shown to be stronger in countries with higher levels of 
corruption (Chen et al., 2010). Lastly, the chance of being caught and prosecuted is seen as 
lower in countries with a higher level of corruption (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Uslaner, 
2004). A consequence of this is that it becomes harder to remove opportunistic agents. Sun 
and Zhang (2006) looked at Chinese managers that was caught for corruption, and 
documented that rather than being punished for their actions, they got relocated or even 
promoted. To summarize, we expect a stronger reaction on firms from more corrupt countries 
since a single act of corruption might signal a larger underlying problem, it leads to general 
mistrust to the firm and uncertantiy if the opportunistic agents will be removed or not.  
Due to limited emperical evidence, it is hard see whether our expectations are right or not, but 
the one study we found, suggest that they are right. A recent event study by Lin, Officer and 
Sun (2015) examine the stock market reactions to misconduct by firms listed in the US, but 
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headquarted in other countries. Not only looking at corruption cases, but also other forms of 
corporate misconduct, Lin et al. (2015) finds 242 cases from 29 different countries in the 
period from 1996 to 2011. Using standard event study methodology, the sample as a whole 
showed strongly significant abnormal return of -13.01% on the event day, which must be seen 
as a much stronger reaction than what was measured in the other studies above. With a focus 
on “spill-over effects”, Lin et al. (2015) examine the reaction to “intra-country peers” of the 
offending firms. They do so by creating portfolios of “innocent” firms from the same country 
as the offending firm, and see how US investors react to firms from the same country as an 
offending firm. Further they divided these portfolios into two groups (high corruption and low 
corruption) depending on the country’s percieved level of corruption. In the three days 
surrounding the event day, portfolios from the ”high corruption”-portfolio showed a CAAR of 
-0.92% and the firms from the ”low-corruption”-portfolio had a CAAR of – 0.61%.  
Lin et al. (2015) thus conclude that firms from more corrupt countries generates larger “spill-
over effects” than firms from less corrupt countries on the announcement of corporate 
misconduct. These results supports the findings of Gelos and Wei (2005), which suggest that 
investors lose more trust to a corrupt firm if it comes from a country with a higher level of 
corruption. Based on these arguments, we find it reasonable to expect firms from more 
countries to show a larger (negative) reaction to news about being corrupt, and we define our 
second hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 2: The country’s level of corruption is negatively associated with the size of the 
cumulative average abnormal returns resulting from the news about a firm being corrupt. 
 
A country’s level of corruption can be an important factor when investors evaluate how 
trustly a firm is, but other firm characteristics can also be of great importance. Lin et al. 
(2015) observed a large standard deviation on the CAAR within the different countries, and 
stressed the importance of controlling for firm-spesific variables.  
One of the most important firm-spesific variables, consistently shown to be correlated with 
CAAR, is firm size (Murphy et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005; Karpoff et al., 2014; Lin et al., 
2015). These studies show that news about corruption tend to have a smaller effect on larger 
firms compared to smaller firms (Murphy et al. 2004). There are two main arguments for this: 
economics of scale and diversification. The costs related to lawsuits, fines, and other direct 
costs do not grow proportional with a firm’s market capitalization. This economics of scale 
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effect makes corruption relatively cheaper for larger firms (Murphy et al. 2004). The other 
factor is diversification; the larger the firm the less idiosyncratic risk. Larger firms tend to be 
more diversified in terms like industries, product lines, customer segments and location. If 
one part of the firm has participated in illegal corporate activities this might not affect other 
parts of the firm. From these arguments, we find it reasonable to assume that firms are 
associated with a higher level of trust than smaller firms. Following the logic that the lack of 
trust tends to amplify the reaction to bad news, one would expect to see a larger size-effect in 
more corrupt countries. Meaning that the benefit of being large is greater in more corrupt 
countries, we define our third hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 3. The effect of the country’s level of corruption on the size of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns resulting from the news about a firm being corrupt will 
be positively moderated by the size of the company.        
 
Another widely used firm-specific variable is sector (Cheung et al., 2011; Bocek, 2013; 
Karpoff et al., 2014), and we would expect some sectors to be more likely to experience 
opportunistic behavior than other. Leite and Weidmann (1999) suggest that firms in sectors 
with a higher level of capital intencity are more likely to be corrupt. Cross-checking sectors 
capital intencity level with Transperency International’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI) supports 
that capital intensity and likelihood of corruption seem to be correlated. This may indicate 
that sectors with a high capital intensity is associated with a lower level of trust, and thus 
should display a stronger reaction to news about corruption. Even though studies done by 
Karpoff et al (2014) and Cheung et al (2011) show somewhat different results, sectors 
associated with a high level of capital intensity (construction, energy, mining, telecom, etc.) 
tends to show a stronger reaction to news about corruption than firms in more labor intensive 
sectors (informational technology, costrumer services etc.).  
Following the logic that lack of trust tend to amplify the reaction to bad news, we would 
expect to see a larger sector-effect in more corrupt countries. Implying that the disadvantage 
of being capital intensive is greater in more corrupt countries, we state our fourth hypothesis 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 4. The effect of the country’s level of corruption on the size of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns resulting from the news about a firm being corrupt will 
be negatively moderated by the level of capital intensity of the firm 
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A less commonly used control variable is the price-book ratio. This ratio is a multiple of the 
market value of equity over the book value of equity, and can tell us how investors value the  
firm compared to what it’s worth on paper (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). A firm with a price-
book ratio of 1 is valued to the booked assets minus the booked liabilities, which means that 
the market value is equal to the accounting value of the firm. However, if a firm has a price-
book ratio of 3, this means that the market values the firm to be worth three times more than 
what the accounting rules should suggest the value to be. This can happen if investors have a 
positive outlook for the firm, and that the firm will capture value that is not yet reflected by 
the accounting rules. For someone to pay three times what something is “worth in theory” 
indicates a high level of trust. Investors have to have confidence in that the firm will be able 
to grow in the future, and distribute the earnings in a fair manner. We can thereby assume that 
a higher price-book ratio indicates a higher level of trust from investors.  
 
Earlier studies which has mentioned this measurement have divided opinions on how firms 
with different price-book ratios react to news about corruption. Murphy et al. (2004) argues 
that firms with a higher price-book ratio will experience a greater loss (more negative 
reaction) since more of their value comes from expectations about future earnings and the 
firm value is relativly less tangible. More in line with our expectations, Karpoff et al. (2014) 
suggests the opposite based on higher level of trust to firms with a high price-book ratio. 
Based on the same logic we have used in the other hypothesis, (lower level of trust tend to 
amplify the reaction to bad news) one could expect that firms with a lower price-book ratio 
would experience a more negative stock price reaction  in more corrupt countries.  
Implying that there is an advantage having a high price-book ratio in more corrupt countries, 
we state our fifth hypothesis as: 
  
Hypothesis 5. The effect of the country’s level of corruption on the size of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns resulting from the news about a firm being corrupt will 
be positively moderated by the firm's P/B ratio 
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3 Method  
3.1 Event study Methodology 
The efficient market hypothesis has led to the rise of event studies as a financial research 
methodology. If stock prices truly reflect all currently available information, then changes in 
price must reflect the addition of new information into the market. Hence, event studies would 
enable us to observe and analyze the impact of an event on a firm’s stock price (Bodie, Kane, 
& Marcus, 2014). According to Fama himself, event studies are “the cleanest evidence we 
have on efficiency” (Fama, 1991).  
In earlier work, an event study was referred to as a semi-strong-form test of market efficiency 
(Fama, 1970). The whole purpose of the event study was to examine how fast stock or 
security prices would reflect new public information. Public information was defined as news 
related to e.g. earning announcements, announcement of mergers or acquisitions or other 
financing decisions.  
The basic method of conducting an event study has not changed notably, and is still largely 
based on the classic studies stemming from the late 1960s. The main intention is to evaluate 
the impact of an event by measuring the associated abnormal returns. When doing an event 
study, we take make basic assumptions: 
 The market is semi-strong efficient 
 The event was unanticipated 
 There were no confounding effects during the event window 
While there is no unique structure to each event study, there often is a general flow of 
analysis. Our event study is performed using the event study methodology described in 
MacKinlay (1997), but also supplemented by Strong (1992).   
3.2 Define the event of interest and identify the time periods 
The first step in doing an event study is to define the event of interest, and to identify the 
period over which the stock prices of the firms included in the event will be examined. This 
time period includes the estimation window, and the event window. The estimation window 
should always be before the event window. Let τ = 0 represent the announcement day. The 
estimation window is then the time period between [T1, T2], and the event window is the time 
period between [T3, T4].  This is illustrated in figure 3.1 below: 
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The length of the estimation window should be determined so that it is long enough to lower 
the variance of the daily returns to a minimum, while being short enough to include only the 
most recent price movement and thus avoid changes in systematic risk (Strong, 1992). 
MacKinlay (1997) uses a 120-day estimation period for daily returns, but other authors have 
used estimation periods between 60 and 600 days, depending on the data used in the study.  
In addition, one also needs to define the event window. The event window is the time period 
around the event of interest, and is used to analyze the abnormal returns. This window follows 
the estimation window, and includes the event day. It is customary to define the event 
window to be larger than the specific day of interest, because this allows estimation of the 
periods surrounding the event (MacKinlay, 1997).  This makes it possible to investigate if 
market managers manage to acquire information prior to the event, and to identify whether or 
not there is a delayed price response. In practice, the event window could vary between 
several days, to a time period, which only includes at least the day of the event. MacKinlay 
(1997) suggests using a [-1, +1] window, however other windows are also common.  
It is important to specify the event window and event day as accurately as possible in order to 
obtain a precise measurement of the effect of the event. Strong (1992) states “in many event 
studies in practice, accuracy of event dates is likely to be more important than sophistication 
in modeling or statistical techniques”. Three problems may arise in this context. First of all, it 
might be that some major announcements, which may have a large effect on the stock price, 
are made after the market closes. Since the market only can react to the news the following 
trading day, it is essential to include the nearest trading day in the analysis of abnormal or 
event specific returns.  
Figure 3.1 – Adapted from MacKinlay 1997: Estimation window is defined as T1 to T2, between T2 
and T3 is a buffer, and event window is defined as T3 to T4. Event day is τ=0 
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Secondly, it is possible that the information was not new to all market participants. The 
market may have expected the event before it was officially announced, or some participants 
may even had inside information on the event. A solution to this issue may be to increase the 
time period before the actual event if information leakage is more likely.  
The third problem is related to confounding events. Confounding events is when different 
events that might impact the stock price, happens in the same time period as the event you 
want to analyze. It then becomes problematic to isolate the effect from the event you are 
analyzing and the effect from the confounding event. Not only can this confounding event 
affect the magnitude of the results, but it can also change the sign of the abnormal return 
(McWilliams, Siegel, & Teoh, 1999). Because of this, controlling for such events is an 
important step when conducting any event study.  
Furthermore, MacKinlay argues the importance to avoid an overlap between the estimation 
window and the event window in order to prevent the event from influencing the estimation 
of normal returns and hence abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997). Hence we always leave a 
buffer of 30 to 50 days between the estimation window and the event window, so that our 
normal return estimation remains uncontaminated by the event. 
3.3 Estimating normal returns 
Before we are able to estimate the abnormal return, we need to choose a normal return model. 
MacKinlay (1997) describes two different choices for modeling the normal return – statistical 
models and economic models. Based on empirical findings by MacKinlay (1997) and Brown 
and Weinstein (1985) which found that event studies with economic models were less 
powerful than using statistical models, we choose to focus exclusively on statistical models 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Brown & Weinstein, 1985). For the statistical models, one assumes that 
returns are jointly multivariate normal, independently and identically distributed over time. 
This assumption is sufficient for the statistical models to be correctly specified (MacKinlay, 
1997). 
There are two common statistical models for modeling normal return – the constant mean 
return model and the market model. The constant mean return model is considered to be the 
simpler of the two. With this model, one assumes that the mean return of a given security is 
constant over time. One thus uses a constant return parameter and a disturbance term to define 
normal returns. So the constant mean return model assumes that the mean return of a stock is 
constant over time. 
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The market model however relates stock return to the return of the market portfolio. The 
model assumes a stable linear relation between the stock return and the market return. The 
linear specification follows from the joint normality assumption. By removing the portion of 
the return which is related to variation in the market return, one reduces the variance of the 
abnormal return. This can again lead to a higher possibility of detecting event effects. Because 
of this, the market model is most often used by researchers and viewed as an improvement 
over the constant mean return model (MacKinlay, 1997). Based on this, we choose to use the 
market model, which says that for any given security i the marked model is: 
𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝜏 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝜏 = 0)            𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝜏) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
Where Rit and Rmt are the t-period returns on security i and the market portfolio respectively. 
it   is the zero mean disturbance term, and i, i, and 2 are the parameters of the market 
model.  
 
3.4 Computing and analyzing abnormal returns 
To measure the true effect of the event`s impact on stock price, one cannot simply use the 
observed market returns to analyze how the market react to an announcement. In order to 
measure the true effect, one has to take away the systematic part of the stock price movement, 
and look at the event-specific unsystematic return component. This unsystematic return 
component is what we refer to as abnormal return.  
In other words the abnormal return is the actual ex-post return of the security over the event 
window minus the normal return of the security over the event window (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The normal return is defined as the expected predicted return if the event never took place.  
For firm i, and the event date τ the abnormal return can we written as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑋𝜏) 
Where ARi  is the abnormal return, Ri is the actual return, and ERi|X) is the normal return 
respectively for time . X is the conditional information for a normal return model.  
In the market model, the abnormal return can be written as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂? = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝜏 
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Where ARi is the abnormal return and Rit is the actual return. i, and i, are the estimated 
parameters from the market model for security i. 
Since the abnormal return is the disturbance term of the marked model calculated on an out of 
sample basis, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional 
mean and a conditional variance 2ARiwhere: 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂?) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 +
1
𝐿1
[1 +
(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝜇?̂?)
2
𝜎𝑚2̂
] 
The equation above illustrates that the conditional variance consist of two components: the 
disturbance variance 2I and the additional variance from sampling error in the market model 
parameters. L1 is the length of the estimation window and is defined as L1 = (T2 – T1). One 
thus see that with increasing L1, the second component will approach zero. This allows the 
variance of the abnormal return to be approximated to 2I as the sampling error of the 
parameter vanishes with increasing L1. As a result: 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏) ≈ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
 
3.5 Aggregation of abnormal returns 
In order to come to any conclusions about the event of interest, the abnormal returns have to 
be aggregated. We often aggregate the abnormal return observations across two different 
dimensions: through time, and across securities. This is usually done by first aggregations 
through time for an individual security, and then aggregation both across securities and 
through time. 
First the abnormal returns are aggregated across time for each individual security i. By doing 
this one finds the individual security`s cumulative abnormal return. This is defined as CARi 
The event window is defined as the time period between T3 and T4. The CARi is then 
estimated from T3 to T4 where T3 < τ3 ≤ τ4 ≤ T4 (MacKinlay, 1997). The accumulative 
abnormal return for security i from T3 to T4, is defined by:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏3, 𝜏4) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝜏4
𝜏=𝜏3
 
Further it can be shown that as L1 increases, the variance and distribution of CAR is:  
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𝜎𝑖
2(𝜏3, 𝜏4) = (𝜏4 − 𝜏3 + 1)𝜎𝜀𝑖
2                        𝐶?̂?𝑅𝑖(𝜏3, 𝜏4)~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2(𝜏3, 𝜏4)) 
The abnormal return also needs to be aggregated across the different securities before it is 
possible to do tests on the sample. By doing a test on only one event sample, makes it very 
unlikely to enable us to draw any conclusions about the overall effect on the event.  We thus 
also need to calculate the average abnormal return for all i securities at each τ of the event 
window. The average abnormal return for each event period is:  
𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑁
𝜏=1
 
And for large L1, the variance of the average abnormal return is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2
𝑁
𝜏=1
 
Finally, the sum of the average abnormal returns over the τ days in the event window is used 
to find the cumulative average abnormal return. This CAARt are useful to statistical analysis, 
due to the fact that it illustrates the effect of the abnormal returns. For any interval in [T3, T4] 
the CAAR is: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏3, 𝜏4) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜏4
𝜏=𝜏3
 
The variance of the CAARt is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏3, 𝜏4)) = ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜏4
𝜏=𝜏3
) 
 
3.6 Determination of statistical significance 
In order to determine the statistical significance of our results, we have to use tests to make 
sure that we have the statistical power necessary to avoid type 1 and type 2 errors. A type 1 
error is that one makes an incorrect rejection of a true H0 (a false positive), while a type 2 
error is the failure to reject a false H0 (a false negative).  
The literature on event study tests is very rich, and the variety of significance tests is 
increasing. In general, significance tests can be grouped in parametric and non-parametric 
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tests. The parametric tests assume that the different firms’ abnormal returns are normally 
distributed. This assumption is not made by non-parametric tests. It is common for event 
studies to complement parametric tests with non-parametric tests to double-check the results. 
We are including a non-parametric test, because this test will be able to provide us with 
information about the amount of firms with positive and negative returns.  
We decided to look at 3 different statistical tests to check whether or not the news about a 
firm being corrupt will result in statistical significant negative accumulative average abnormal 
return. These tests were: 
Parametric tests. 
- A cross sectional T-test 
- Standardized cross-sectional test / BMP test 
Non-parametric test: 
- Sign test  
An important feature about the sign test, is the way we interpret the test if the results are 
insignificant. If this test shows an insignificant ratio but the parametric tests show a 
significant abnormal return, then we know that there might be other factors, such as firm 
characteristics, that would be involved in moderating the cumulative average abnormal return. 
This would then imply that our sample consists of firms with an equal ratio of positive and 
negative returns, which shows different sizes of abnormal returns depending on firm 
characteristics. 
As earlier mentioned, analysis is normally performed to specify if the abnormal return in the 
event period is significantly different from zero, and thus not just a results of chance. By the 
general principles of statistics, the H0 thus maintains that there is no cumulative average 
abnormal returns in the event window, while the alternative hypothesis H1 the opposite.  
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡,𝑖 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡,𝑖 ≠ 0 
Where the t is the event window used, and i is indicating group. 
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3.6.1 Cross-sectional T-test 
To be able to test the null hypothesis that the event does not affect return, a two-sided cross-
sectional t-test is used. The statistical properties of the CAARt are assumed to be  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏3, 𝜏4)~𝑁[0, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏3, 𝜏4))] 
And any inferences about the CAAR can be drawn using this to test the null hypothesis. The 
test used to test this hypothesis is based on the assumptions that there is no correlation across 
the abnormal returns of the different securities. Furthermore, if there is clustering or overlaps 
in the event window of the included securities, correlation between abnormal returns across 
the different events may occur. With no overlaps or clustering and the maintained 
distributional assumptions made previously, the abnormal returns across the different 
securities will be independent (MacKinlay, 1997). This was checked for, and we did not have 
any clustering or overlaps in any of our event windows. 
Because the real value of 2I is unknown, it is necessary to use an estimator to calculate the 
variance of average abnormal returns. MacKinlay (1997) argues that the usual sample 
variance measure of the 2I from the market model regression is an appropriate choice 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
Using this to calculate the variance of the average abnormal returns, the test statistic for 
testing H0 is given by:  
𝜏𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
 
Where SCAAR is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns across the sample. 
This distributional result is asymptotic with respect to the number of securities i, and the 
length of the estimation window. However, as explained by Brown and Warner (1985), the 
cross-sectional test is prone to be influenced by event-induced volatility and cross-sectional 
correlation, and thus has low statistical power. 
3.6.2 Standardized cross-sectional test or BMP-test 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) proposed another cross-sectional test, which they 
called the BMP-test. This test is a standardized cross-sectional method, which is robust to the 
variance created by the event itself.  This test has become more popular in recent years, due to 
the fact that it has been found to be more robust with respect to the possible volatility changes 
connected with the event (Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010). 
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The test statistic for testing H0 is given as:  
𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 = √𝑁
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Where SCAR is the average standardized accumulated abnormal return across the N different 
firms, with a standard deviation of: 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The advantages of using the standardized cross-sectional T-test is that it takes into account 
several of the problems associated with the normal cross-sectional T-test. This test accounts 
for event-induced volatility and serial correlation (Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010).  
3.6.3 Sign test 
To supplement the parametric tests, event studies normally report non-parametric tests. In our 
study we will be using a sign-test, which have the advantage that it does not rely on symmetry 
of the abnormal return distribution. The sign test was introduced by Cowan (1992) and tries to 
test if the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns present in the event window 
significantly differs from a ratio P. The ratio Ƥ is the ratio of positive abnormal return in the 
event window, and N is the number of firms (Cowan, 1992). 
This test is well specified to test whether or not the amount of positive and negative 
observations differs from what would be expected from the data. Based on the efficient 
market hypothesis, one would expect the abnormal returns to follow a random walk. This 
implies that the amount of positive and negative abnormal returns would be expected to be 
50%.  
The test statistic for the sign test is given as: 
𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = √𝑁 (
?̂? − 0.5
√0.5(1 − 0.5)
) 
Where the H0 is that the ratio Ƥ = 0.5. 
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3.7 OLS regression 
In order to provide an answer for our hypotheses regarding characteristics that may affect the 
cumulative abnormal return in the event windows, we are going to use a regression. 
Following Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), we will use an OLS-regression to check if there 
are any firm characteristics that may explain any cross-sectional variation in cumulative 
abnormal return. The firm characteristics we are going to control for are the level of 
corruption, the size of the company, the firms P/B ratio, and the capital intensity of the firm. 
By using OLS-regression and interaction variables, allows us to also check if there are any 
significant differences within each subsample. 
There are several assumptions that need to be satisfied in order for an OLS-regression to 
provide unbiased and efficient coefficients which can justify a causal relationship.  Most of 
these assumptions are about the residuals and are presented below: 
1) Normality of residuals 
2) The correct specification 
3) Homoscedasticity of residuals 
4) No autocorrelation 
After controlling for normality, we found the distribution to satisfy the assumption of 
normality. To check the correct specification, we ran a Ramsey`s regression error 
specification test, which test if a model who includes additional nonlinearities fits the data 
better. This was done directly in STATA and we could reject the null hypothesis that we had a 
wrongly specified model. Correcting for potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was 
done by using robust standard errors.  
The regression will then be performed on the different firm characteristics, and potential 
differences will be expressed through significant coefficients. 
3.8 Overview of choices 
This section will provide a brief summary of our choices regarding to the standard event study 
methodology. We defined our event of interest as the announcement of corruption. The event 
day (τ = 0) is defined as the first trading day the news about corruption became publicly 
available to the market in which the firm operates. This ensured that the market was able to 
react on the information the same day. Furthermore we decided to use several different event 
windows ranging from five days before to five days after the event day. This was because we 
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wanted to check if there were any differences in cumulative average abnormal return on 
medium and short event windows. This also enables us to capture the effect of the corruption 
announcement both prior to, and post event date. Including days before the event date, allows 
us to check if there has been any leakages of information, while including days after the 
announcement date makes it possible to see if there is a delayed market reaction 
The parameters αi and βi are estimated by using ordinary least square (OLS), using the daily 
returns for each company from 250 trading days prior to the announcement date for each 
event. As recommended by MacKinlay, we leave a buffer of 45 days between the end of the 
estimation window and the start of the event window. This implies that our estimation 
window is [-250, -50], and thus contains 200 trading days. We further assume that an 
estimation window L1 of 200 trading days is enough to apply the approximation estimation of 
the variance of abnormal returns. 
Daily stock prices were obtained from Bloomberg for all trading days in the period from -250 
until +5. We used adjusted closing price calculated daily return from these stock prices.  
In regards of cofounding events we checked for the following events: 
 -  Joint Ventures, mergers or acquisitions  
 -  Changes in top management 
 -  Dividends or stock repurchases  
 -  Earning announcements  
 -  Changes in credit ratings 
 
Firms with any of these news in the period from 5 days before until 5 days after the event was 
excluded from the final sample. This made it possible to marginalize the problem of 
confounding events. 
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4 Data sample 
4.1 The firms and markets 
The sample in this study consists of firms from the US, UK, Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
In order to examine the effect of corruption level on firms stock price returns, we had to 
divide our sample into two groups based on the country`s corruption level. This was done by 
using Transparency International`s CPI index and database for 2014. This measure has been 
used in earlier studies made by both Fisman and Miguel (2007) and DeBacker, Heim and 
Tran (2012). The CPI index ranks different countries based on the perceived level of 
corruption among its own citizens and the opinions of institutions such as the World Bank and 
the World Economic Forum. Countries, which have a low level of perceived corruption, will 
be ranked high on the index, and countries, which have a high level of perceived corruption, 
will be ranked low on the index.  
There are several reasons why we decided to focus on these six countries. First of all, all of 
the countries are major world economies. This assured us that we would have a great access 
to information. It also made it reasonable to assume semi-strong market efficiency as implied 
by the efficient market hypothesis. To further ensure that our data was updated and trusted, 
we decided to look exclusively at firms listed at a stock exchange. The following stock 
exchanges where included: NASDAQ (US), NYSE (US), London Stock Exchange (UK), 
BOVESPA (Brazil), MICEX (Russia), BSE India, HKEX (China) and SSE (China). Even 
though there are other stock exchanges in some of the countries, we only used the largest or 
the second largest exchange in our thesis. This way we ensured that the liquidity and 
analytical coverage of the markets were sufficient.  
Furthermore, the countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China has all been deemed to be at a 
similar stage of economic development. In economic literature they are often referred to as the 
BRIC-countries (O`Neill, 2001). This acronym has later been used as a symbol to illustrate 
the apparent shift in global economic power away from the developed economies, like the US 
and UK, towards these emerging markets. The inter-group relationship between BRIC-
countries and more developed countries has thus been a popular research subject in the recent 
years. We decided to use the US and UK as an opposing group to the BRICs, since these 
countries also seemed to be at the same stage of economic development.  
When checking for the level of corruption using the CPI index, we noticed a clear difference 
in corruption levels between the countries. The BRIC-countries were concentrated at the 
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lower end of the index with an average CPI score of 36, while the US and UK were ranked 
much higher with an average score of 76 (Transparency International, 2014). This indicated 
that the BRIC-countries in general seemed to have a high level of perceived corruption, while 
the perceived corruption in non-BRIC countries were much lower.  
This led us to the following grouping of the countries: 
Less corrupt countries – consisting of firms listed in the US and UK. 
More corrupt countries – consisting of firms listed in Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
4.2 Time horizon 
We are choosing to focus on corruption scandals from the last 5 years. The financial crisis in 
2008 can be seen as an extraordinary event, so including the immediate time period after this 
crisis to estimate normal returns could lead to severely biased estimates and wrong 
conclusions. We could have included the period before 2008, but we wanted to make this 
thesis as updated and relevant as possible. The time horizon in the study is from April 2010 
until April 2015, and the sample was collected and completed in May 2015. 
4.3 Data collection process 
As stated in the introduction, the reason for this thesis is to see how news about corruption 
scandals affects the stock prices of firms from countries with different levels of corruption. 
Therefore we needed to find sufficient new corruption scandals. A comprehensive manual 
search and selection process was conducted in May 2015 using the search engine Factiva.  
The search word used were: “Corruption”, “Bribe”, “Bribery”, “Bribing”, “kick back” and 
“kick-back”. 
Over our five year period, these searches resulted in a high amount of hits for many firms. To 
correctly implement the event study methodology, the resulting firms from the given stock 
exchanges had to undergo a more thorough selection process. 
4.4 Selection criteria 
With thousands of hits on the different search words over the five-year period, an initial 
screen was needed. Many of the hits were duplicates from different newspapers, updates 
about the same case or information not related to corruption. We then did an initial screen 
manually using three different steps: 
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1) A firm within our scope that was related to any of the search words was marked 
2) A search with the firm and the search words were done, and the most relevant 
article found skimmed through 
3) If the firm did not seem to be involved in corruption (within our scope) another 
article was skimmed through, if there were still no reason to believe that this firm had 
been related to corruption the firm was dropped.  
A reason for being dropped could be that a firm had been convicted for corruption 10 years 
ago (outside our scope) or that a firm was interviewed regarding the costs of corruption, but 
had no involvement in corruption what so ever. However, a firm would not be dropped if it 
was corrupt 10 years ago, but first within the last 5 years this became known.  After the initial 
selection/screening we were left with 129 different cases. Further selection was then 
conducted, and for a case to make it to the final sample it had to fulfill the following 
criteria’s:  
-First news about the given corruption scandal had to be within our scope (It could not 
only follow up on the same case)  
-The firm or its direct subsidiary had to be mentioned explicit in relations to corruption 
the article. However, the firm didn’t have to be officially charged with corruption. 
-The firm had to be listed on the same stock exchange for at least one year before the 
first announcement (i.e. it could not go from a private to public company or vice 
versa.)  
-A firm could not be in the sample more than once. However, various firms could be 
related to the same scandal. This would then lead to one case for each firm. 
-There should be no confounding events 5 days before until 5 days after 
After the final selection our sample ended up consisting of 71 unique cases, which will be 
further investigated in our study. A detailed table describing each of these cases is found in 
Table C.1 in Appendix. 
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4.5 Descriptive analysis  
 
 
We classified each individual case with the respective event date, country, stock exchange, 
company name, company ticker, market capitalization in USD one year prior to event date, 
price-to-book ratio, and sector.  
The 71 different cases are evenly distributed between in the less-corrupt group and the more-
corrupt group with 34 and 37 individual cases respectively. Figure 4.1 shows a complete 
distribution of cases by country. 
Using the Global Industry Classification Standard`s 10 sectors, the groups was divided into 10 
different groups. These were: Information technology, Financials, Health Care, Consumer 
Staples, Consumer Discretionary, Telecommunication, Utilities, Energy, Materials and 
Industrial. The distribution of companies and the relative size of the sectors is illustrated in 
figure 4.2. 
In order to check for capital intensity, we also had to divide the firms into either capital 
intensive sectors or labor intensive sectors. Capital intensive sectors are sectors which 
requires a substantial amount of capital for production. They are further characterized by 
involving a high level of fixed cost, and industries capable of generating a high level of profit. 
Based on this, we decided on the following grouping of sectors: 
Capital intensive – Telecommunications, Energy, Materials, Industrials, Financials and 
Utilities 
Figure 4.1- Distribution of firms by country 
Figure 4.2-Distribution of firms by sectors 
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Labor intensive – Consumer discretionary, Consumer staples, Health care, and Information 
technology 
The sample can also be categorized according to their respective market capitalization. This is 
illustrated for each country, and for each of the groups in table 4.1. All numbers are listed in 
USD millions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown, the average market capitalization for the US ($34.5 USD billion), UK ($33. USD 
billion), Brazil ($36 USD billion) and Russia ($32 USD billion) is very similar. However, the 
average market capitalization for India ($13 USD billion) and China ($53 USD billion) differ 
much from the other countries. Nonetheless, we see that the group-averages are quite similar. 
Also, the largest firm in our sample is 100 times larger than the smallest firm. Even though 
there are large differences in size, it seems to be divided more or less evenly in the different 
groups.  
4.6 Measures 
d_Corrupt – This is a dummy variable, which are representing our two mutually exclusive 
groups [Less-corrupt, More-corrupt].  The variable will take the numerical value of 1 if the 
company is in the more-corrupt group, and the value of 0 if it is in the less-corrupt group. 
Marketcap_USDbn – This variable contains data on the market capitalization of the firm in 
USD. The variable is measured in USD billion. 
d_Sector – This is a dummy variable, which are representing our two mutually exclusive 
groups [Capital intensive, Labor intensive]. The variable will take the value of 1 if the 
company operates in a capital intensive sector, and the value of 0 if the company operates in a 
labor intensive sector.  
Table 4.3 - Market capitalization by country and by group. All values in USDm 
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PBratio – This variable contains data on the price/book-ratio of the firm.   
d_Corrupt x MktUSDbn – This is a moderation variable, which is defined as the dummy for 
d_Corrupt multiplied with the market capitalization of the firm. The moderation variable will 
only take value if the company is in the more-corrupt group. This variable can be interpreted 
as the within-group effect of increasing the Marketcap_USDbn-variable with one unit.. 
d_Corrupt x d_Sector – This is a moderation variable, which is defined as the dummy for 
d_Corrupt multiplied with the dummy for sector. This moderating variable will be equal to 1 
if the company operates in a capital intensive sector in the more-corrupt group, and 0 
otherwise. This variable can be interpreted as the within-group effect of operating in a capital 
intensive sector 
d_Corrupt x PBratio – This is a moderation variable, which is defined as the dummy for 
d_Corrupt multiplied with the price-book ratio of the firm. This moderating variable will only 
take value if the company is in the more-corrupt group. The variable can be interpreted as the 
within-group effect of the price-book ratio. 
Constant – This is the constant term from the OLS-regression.  
𝜀𝑖 – Is the error term. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Event study results 
In the first hypothesis, we tested if news about a firm being corrupt would result in a negative 
accumulative average abnormal return. This was done by implementing the event study 
methodology, and checking for significant abnormal returns using the t-test and the BMP-test. 
 
Table 5.1 - Results from event study on full sample 
Table 5.1 displays the results from using the event study methodology on the full sample. In 
the [-3, 3] event windows the ratio of negative events was 56.3%, and in the other three the 
ratio was 57.7%. The cumulate average abnormal return was all negative, and in the interval 
between -1.68% and -0.90%. 
The significance level vary depending on which statistical test and event window we are 
using. The sign-test gives no significant results for any of the event windows, and the results 
from the [-1, 1] window is not significant for any of the tests. This indicates that there is a 
somewhat even distribution of positive and negative CAR, which again would mean that there 
are other firm characteristics that might be relevant. Both the t-test and the BMP-test indicates 
significant abnormal returns in the [-5, 5] and the [-3, 3] windows. In the [-1, 5] window, only 
the BMP-test indicates significant abnormal return. The results thus indicate that there seems 
to be a significant abnormal return in the medium event windows.  
The figure 5.1 illustrates the average abnormal return and the cumulative average abnormal 
return for all of our firms in the [-5, 5] and [-3, 3] window.  
Results full sample
Event window CAARt T-Test BMP-test Sign-test Ratio of negative events
[-5, 5] -1,52 % -1,796 * -1,874 * -1,068 0,577
[-3, 3] -1,68 % -2,459 *** -2,552 ** -1,305 0,563
[-1, 1] -0,90 % -1,572 -1,440 -1,068 0,577
[-1, 5] -1,09 % -1,541 -1,852 * -1,068 0,577
Number of firms 71 71 71 71
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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In figure 5.2, we can see that the CAARt starts to fall approximately 2 days before the event 
day in both of the event windows, and then continues a downwards drift before stabilizing 
around an abnormal return of -1.50%. The largest falls in average abnormal return happens 
the day before the event and three days after, which represents falls of -0.49% and -0.54% 
respectively. The largest negative cumulative average abnormal return occurs three days after 
the event days in both windows, where the CAARt is –1.80% in the [-5, 5] window and -
1.68% in the [-3, 3] window. A full table of the individual AARt and CAAR at time t in each 
event window can be found in table A.1 in Appendix. 
We also tested the individual event window specific CAARs in each of the groups to see if 
there was a significant reaction in both of our groups. The conclusion was the both of our 
groups showed a significant reaction in the [-3, 3] window. These results and graphical 
illustrations of AARt and CAARt in both groups can be found in table A.2 – A.5 and B.1 – 
B.3 in Appendix. 
6.2 Regression results  
In our second hypothesis, we wanted to test whether or not the country`s level of corruption is 
negatively associated with the size of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a firm. The 
CAR should not be mixed with the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) which we 
used in the event studies. To do this, we used the standard event study methodology to 
calculate the CAR for each of our firms in the respective event windows. These calculations 
would be used as the dependent variable in our OLS-regression.  
Figure 5.2- Illustration of AARt and CAARt for the full sample (71 firms) 
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When testing the hypotheses regarding the effect of the country`s level of corruption, we had 
to run the following regressions: 
Model (1) represents a regression on CARt using only the control variables and the direct 
effect. The regression model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑏𝑛 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝜀𝑖 
Model (2) represents a regression on CARt using the control variables, the direct effect, and 
adding interaction variables to test for moderation effects. This can be considered to be our 
main regression model and is defined as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑏𝑛 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽5
∗ (𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑏𝑛) + 𝛽6 ∗ (𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) +  𝛽7
∗ (𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝜀𝑖 
In both regressions  𝜀𝑖 is an error term. 
The table 5.3 illustrates the results from running these to regressions on the CAR for all of our 
event windows. 
 
Table 5.3 - Results from running regression analysis 
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The results show that the direct effect of corruption level is negative in all of our event 
windows. The coefficient of “d_Corrupt” represents the effect of the country`s level of 
corruption. A negative coefficient is in line with the expectation of a negative relationship 
between the level of corruption and the size of the CAR. This would indicate that the effect of 
being caught by corruption itself would be amplified if the firm is located in a country with a 
higher level of corruption. The general trend in the data seems to support this, since most of 
our coefficients are negative. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant 
and based on this we cannot say that the estimated coefficients differs from zero. Statistically 
this means that we do not find adequate evidence for rejecting our null hypothesis. Thus 
hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
The results also shows that the control variable for market capitalization has positive 
coefficients in all of our event windows. A positive coefficient indicates that the general effect 
of an increase in market capitalization, would diminish the size of the CAR. In model (1) we 
see that we get significant coefficients in both the [-5, 5] and the [-3, 3] window. These 
coefficients are significant at a 10%- and 5%-level respectively. In these cases, a $1bn 
increase in market capitalization is predicted to positively affect the CAR by 0.0219% and 
0.0201%. This is in line with the expectation that an increasing market capitalization would 
have a diminishing effect on the size of the CAR. However, we see that when running model 
(2), the control variables in all event windows yields insignificant results. This means that the 
effect is significant, but disappears when we account for other variables in our main model. 
The sign of the coefficients remains the same, so the predicted direction of the effect remains 
the same. Because we have insignificant coefficients in model (2), we cannot draw any 
statistical conclusions about the general effect of size.  
The results further show that all of the coefficients for the moderation variable between the 
level of corruption and the size of the market capitalization is positive. The moderation 
variable coefficients can be interpreted as the difference-in-difference effect. A positive 
coefficient will indicate that an increasing market capitalization, would positively moderate 
the effect of the country`s level of corruption on the size of the CAR. This would be in line 
with our expectations in hypothesis 3. Since all of the coefficients for the moderation variable 
between level of corruption and size of market capitalization is insignificant, we do not have 
evidence to reject our null hypothesis. Thus hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
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Looking at the control variable for capital intensity, we see that the coefficients is negative in 
all of our event windows and in both of our models. A negative coefficients indicates that the 
general effect of operating in a capital intensive sector, would have a negative effect on the 
size of the CAR. This is in line with our expectations of a negative relationship between being 
in a capital intensive sector and the effect of being caught for corruption.  The results for the 
control variable is however not significant in any of the event windows, meaning that we 
cannot draw any statistical conclusions of the general effect of capital intensity.  
With regard to the moderation variable between the level of corruption and the capital 
intensity of the firm, we see that the coefficients is negative in all of our event windows 
except the [-3, 3] window. The moderation variable can be interpreted as the difference-in-
difference effect, and a negative coefficient predicts that being in a more capital intensive 
sector, would negatively amplify the effect of the country`s level of corruption on the size of 
the CAR.  This is in line with our expectations in hypothesis 4. The moderation variable do 
however, not yield any significant coefficients in the event windows and thus gives us no 
evidence to reject our null hypothesis. Because of this hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Lastly, we see that the coefficient for the control variable for the price-book ratio is positive 
for all event windows in model (1) and negative in all event windows in model (2). The 
coefficient can be interpreted as the effect on the CAR if the price-book ratio increased with 
one unit. A negative coefficient will in this case indicate that the effect of an increasing price-
book ratio, will have a negative effect on the size of the CAR. A positive coefficient would 
have the reversed relationship. The results show that none of the coefficients have significant 
values, and because of this we cannot comment with significant inference about the general 
effect of the price-book ratio. We do however notice, that when controlling for more 
variables, the coefficients changes sign from positive, to negative.  
When looking at the moderation variable between the level of corruption and the price-book 
ratio, the results show that all of the coefficients are positive. This moderation variable 
coefficient can be understood as the difference-in-difference effect, and a positive effect 
indicates that an increasing price-book ratio would positively moderate the effect of the 
country`s level corruption on the size of the CAR. Such a relationship would support our 
expectations in hypothesis 5. The results show significant coefficients on a 10% level in the   
[-5, 5] and [-3, 3] window, and the coefficients predicts that the effect of the country`s level of 
corruption on the size of the CAR resulting from corrupt activities will be positively 
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moderated by the firms P/B-ratio. This effect estimated to be 3.36% in the [-5, 5] window and 
2.55% in the [-3, 3] window.  
Based on these results, we find sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
moderation effect in the [-5, 5] and [-3, 3] window. Even though we don’t get significant 
results in the [-1, 1] and [-1, 5] window, we see that the sign is corresponding and can say that 
the results indicates the same effect. This means that hypothesis 5 is supported. 
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6 Discussion and conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to examine if firms from countries characterized as more 
corrupt would experience a modified reaction compared to firms from countries which are 
seen as less corrupt. This was done by examining whether markets exhibited different 
reactions to news about firms being corrupt in countries with different levels of corruption. 
We also checked for specific firm characteristics to see of the reaction of being caught in 
corrupt activities would be moderated by either market capitalization, capital intensity or 
price-book ratio.  
Our results supports the already existing studies done on the effect of corruption, concluding 
that there seems to be a general negative effect on stock price from news about a firm being 
corrupt. We have estimated the cumulative average abnormal return in four different event 
windows, in which two of them result in significant negative effects. In our [-5, 5] and [-3, 3] 
windows we have found evidence that, on average, the cumulative average abnormal return is 
-1.68% and -1.52% respectively. This corresponds with already existing studies done on the 
subject, such as the study done by Karpoff et al (2014) which finds a negative CAAR of -
1.72%. Based on this we conclude that the stock market reactions to news of corruption in a 
firm is negative, regardless of the country`s corruption level. 
Another interesting observation is that our sample seems to have a longer reaction than 
previous studies. The cumulative average abnormal return we see after examining the seven 
days surrounding the event, is in the most other studies observed in only three days. So 
instead of a sudden and clear reaction on the announcement day, we see that the sample start 
falling three days before, and keep falling until three days after the event day. The fact that we 
see negative reactions the days before the announcement can indicate leakages to the market 
and that some investors react before the information becomes publically available. Also the 
longer reaction after the announcement day suggests that the markets are not as efficient as 
the efficient market hypothesis indicates. 
Exploring this further, the regression results does however not indicate that there is a 
significant difference in the reactions based on the country`s level of corruption. We do 
however notice that all of our coefficients in the different event windows in negative, which 
may indicate a negative relationship. In neither of our event windows do we find sufficient 
evidence for the CAR being moderated by the country`s level of corruption. This contradicts 
the results found by Lin et al (2015) which found a significantly different CAAR between the 
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high-corruption and-low corruption groups. However, this might be explained by the 
difference samples, and due to the fact that Lin et al. (2015) only is US-listed firms in US 
markets, while we use the market in which the country actually operates.   
There could be some possible reasons for this difference. Pellegrini et al. (2015) suggested 
that foreign investors are more “nervous” in countries with a higher level of corruption, and 
from this we initially expected a stronger reaction in these countries. Another way of 
considering Pellegrini et al. (2015) argument could be that nervous investors may already 
have priced the risk of “corruption” if the level of corruption is high, and thus show an 
expectation to these types of news. If this were the case, then the news would not come as 
such a surprise, which could result in a more disciplined reaction.  
Even though we don’t find sufficient evidence for a stronger reaction to firms from more 
corrupt countries, we can’t conclude by saying that a country’s level of corruption doesn’t 
affect the reaction. Both groups show very similar reactions until 2 days after the 
announcement, but then start to differ. This might indicate that if one uses longer event 
windows and look at the more long term effects, one could examine if the is a more short term 
reaction in the less corrupt countries while there is a more long term effect in more corrupt 
countries.  
Furthermore our results supports the research done by Murphy et al (2004) and Chen et al 
(2005) which finds that that news about corruption seems to have a smaller effect on large 
firms. This complements the economies of scale and diversification arguments, where large 
firms on average have less idiosyncratic risk. This result was somewhat expected. If the act of 
corruption imposes somewhat fixed costs in terms of fines and legal expenses, then large 
firms would be much more capable in paying these costs. Another explanation might be that 
large firms often has a much more structured system, which means that they could be more 
efficient in removing the people behind the corrupt acts and thus “clearing” their name faster. 
Large firms may also have own public-relation departments, which would put them in a 
position to counter the potential reputational damages created by the corruption scandal. One 
might not expect that much smaller firms would have such systems in place, and thus the 
reputational damages might be much higher.  
We expected that the advantage of being a large company would be greater in a more corrupt 
country, however we don’t find evidence for firm size moderating the effect of a country’s 
corruption level. However, the sign of the coefficients are all positive, which indicates that 
 ___________________________________________________________________________  
 41 
there is trend where large firms in more corrupt countries show an extra size effect. This result 
was somewhat surprising, because we expected that the advantages of being a large firm 
would be significantly amplified when operating in a more corrupt country. A possible 
explanation might be that the advantage of being large, already is so great that it does not 
matter whether you are operating in a more corrupt country or not. In addition, perhaps the 
business environment for such large firms is so equal, that there in reality is no difference 
between the firms. This could suggest a strong international connection among large firms, 
and the effects of reputational losses in forms of decreased sales and increased costs is 
identical in a cross-national perspective. 
The results regarding sector suggest a negative relationship between operating in a capital 
intensive sector and the size of the CAR. All of the coefficients for sector is negative, thus 
implying that sectors with a high level of capital intensity tends to react stronger on news 
about corruption. This partly supports the findings for Cheung et al. (2011) and Karpoff et al. 
(2014), however our findings do not find a signficant relationship. A possible explanation 
might be that the lack of trust and the amplified reaction based on this, is not as large as we 
expected and thus that there really is no difference between the sectors. Furthermore, if the 
profits are much higher in the capital intensive industries then the investors might decide to 
partially “overlook” the fact that one has been caught for corruption. In the same manner, our 
data suggests that there is a negative cost from operating in a capital intensive sector in more 
corrupt countries, but neither these results are statistically significant.  
In term of the effect of an higher price-book ratio, our findings suggest that the general effect 
of having a higher price-book ratio would lead to a more negative reaction. This is based on 
the fact that all of the coefficients in model (2) was negative. These results are in line with the 
arguments presented by Murphy et al. (2004), which suggests that firms with a higher price-
book ratio would experience a greater loss since a larger part of their firm value comes from 
estimations about future earnings. However, we do find that having a larger price-book ratio 
in more corrupt countries is positively affecting the size of the CAR, meaning that our 
expectations in hypothesis 5 was correct. Our results thus support the findings of Karpoff et al 
(2014). This could suggest that firms with a high price-book ratio in more corrupt countries 
are associated with a higher level of trust and this decrease the reaction.  
In conclusion, we see that corruption in general would affect the firms performance trough 
reactions in the stock price. We have found results supporting the already existing literature 
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on firm-level costs of corruption, and contributed with new findings with regards to showing 
that corruption has an overall effect on all firms, regardless of country of operation. While our 
findings signals a reaction in the medium length event windows, we believe we have 
sufficient evidence to conclude with an overall general effect within a 7-day period around the 
event day. 
Our main focus was to investigate the relationship between a country`s level of corruption and 
the effect on stock price reactions, but we did not find sufficient evidence to prove a causal 
relationship between the two. Hence we had to conclude that the results signal a negative 
relationship, but we cant provide evidence that the difference is large enough to not just be a 
product of chance. In addition we find that firm size seem to positively affect the size of the 
CAR, but the within group effect is not large enough to say that there is a signifciant 
additional effect of being large in more corrupt countries. Regarding the price-book ratio we 
find that there seem to be an positive additional effect of having a higher price-book ratio in 
more corrupt countries. All in all our findings implies that firms face a penaltiy for violating 
the trust given to them from investors.  
So what could really explain what happened to the Petrobras stock? Based on our research we 
are still somewhat surprised. Nothing from our findings indicate that a massive positive 
reaction should be a reasonable response to a corruption scandal. Perhaps the investors 
already had such a low degree of trust to the company, and expected that it was just a matter 
of time before a corruption scandal would occur. This could have led to a massive 
undervaluation of the firm. When the news of corruption then hit the markets, the investors 
might have gained a renewed confidence in the company, through the belief of starting over 
with clean sheets. Or perhaps it was other underlying factors which can validate such a 
reponse. The perplexity of this problem, points to the continued importance of expanding the 
theory on the firm-level costs of corruption.  
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7 Limitations 
7.1 Small sample 
A limitation with our study may be the sample size. Statistical inference in the event study 
methodology is largely dependent on the number of observations in the sample. When 
determining statistical inference using the standard t-test, the normality assumption is 
important. When the sample size is very small, there is reason to believe that the assumption 
of normality does not hold. This is especially true when the sample size is less than 30 
observations. In our thesis we have a sample which consists of 71 different firms. Under the 
central limit theorem, this is well within the needed sample size. Even when dividing the 
sample into our two subsamples with 34 and 37 observations, we still have a sample size 
which exceeds the needed number of observations for assuming normality. As Brown and 
Warner (1985) also showed that even in event studies with sample sizes as small as 5 
observations, the standard parametric tests for significance are still well specified (Brown & 
Warner, 1985). The sample collected is also the whole population of firms, within our 
selection criteria’s, that were caught for corruption. This means that to further increase our 
sample size, we would have had to implement sub-standard selection criteria`s compared to 
other event studies. To us, this was not an acceptable solution. Another way to increase it 
would be to include more countries, however this would have led to more problems in regards 
to the correlation between development and level of corruption. 
7.2 Correlation between development and level of corruption 
The main purpose with our study was to check whether or not a country`s level of corruption 
could affect how the market reacts to news that a firm has been involved in corrupt activities. 
The problem with the country`s corruption level, is that it often confounds with the level of 
economic development. If this correlation is high, then we cannot be completely sure that we 
are studying the effect of the country`s level of corruption or the effect of the country`s level 
of development on stock price. Even though we have a small sample of countries, we have 
marginalized this problem by using countries that share the similar characteristics in terms of 
economic development. An example is in terms of sheer economic weight. The BRIC 
economies are the four largest economies outside of the OECD, and they are the only 
emerging economies with an annual GDP profit over 1$ trillion (OECD, 2013). Furthermore 
the BRIC countries all have economies with large financial markets, something which reduces 
the gap with the more developed countries. Due to these similarities one can assume that they 
are well integrated in the global economy, and thus share the similar characteristics in terms 
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of market efficiency. By including the countries we have in our sample, we have tried to 
minimize the variance in development, while maintaining a difference in the countries 
corruption level.  
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9 Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – Full table of individual AARt and CAARt for full sample 
 
 
Table A.2 – Full table of individual AARt and CAARt for less corrupt group 
[-5, 5] [-1, 5] [-3, 3] [-1, 1]
Day AARt Day CAARt CAARt CAARt CAARt
-5 -0,11 % -5 -0,11 % - - -
-4 -0,01 % -4 -0,13 % - - -
-3 -0,42 % -3 -0,55 % - -0,42 % -
-2 0,12 % -2 -0,43 % - -0,30 % -0,49 %
-1 -0,49 % -1 -0,92 % -0,49 % -0,79 % -0,65 %
0 -0,16 % 0 -1,08 % -0,65 % -0,95 % -0,90 %
1 -0,25 % 1 -1,33 % -0,90 % -1,21 % -
2 0,07 % 2 -1,27 % -0,84 % -1,14 % -
3 -0,54 % 3 -1,80 % -1,37 % -1,68 % -
4 0,05 % 4 -1,75 % -1,32 % - -
5 0,23 % 5 -1,52 % -1,09 % - -
-1,52 % -1,09 % -1,68 % -0,90 %
Event window
Total CAARt
EVENT STUDY - FULL SAMPLE
[-5, 5] [-1, 5] [-3, 3] [-1, 1]
Day AARt Day CAARt CAARt CAARt CAARt
-5 0,26 % -5 0,26 % - - -
-4 -0,09 % -4 0,17 % - - -
-3 -0,47 % -3 -0,30 % - -0,47 % -
-2 0,00 % -2 -0,30 % - -0,47 % -0,51 %
-1 -0,51 % -1 -0,81 % -0,51 % -0,98 % -0,65 %
0 -0,14 % 0 -0,95 % -0,65 % -1,12 % -0,84 %
1 -0,18 % 1 -1,13 % -0,84 % -1,30 % -
2 -0,15 % 2 -1,28 % -0,99 % -1,45 % -
3 0,10 % 3 -1,18 % -0,89 % -1,36 % -
4 0,26 % 4 -0,92 % -0,63 % - -
5 0,28 % 5 -0,64 % -0,35 % - -
-0,64 % -0,35 % -1,36 % -0,84 %
EVENT STUDY - LESS CORRUPT FIRMS
Event window
Total CAARt
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Table A.3 – Full table of individual AARt and CAARt for more corrupt group 
 
 
Table A.4 –Results from event study on less corrupt group 
 
[-5, 5] [-1, 5] [-3, 3] [-1, 1]
Day AARt Day CAARt CAARt CAARt CAARt
-5 -0,46 % -5 -0,46 % - - -
-4 0,06 % -4 -0,40 % - - -
-3 -0,38 % -3 -0,78 % - -0,38 % -
-2 0,23 % -2 -0,55 % - -0,15 % -0,47 %
-1 -0,47 % -1 -1,02 % -0,47 % -0,62 % -0,65 %
0 -0,18 % 0 -1,20 % -0,65 % -0,80 % -0,96 %
1 -0,32 % 1 -1,51 % -0,96 % -1,12 % -
2 0,26 % 2 -1,25 % -0,70 % -0,85 % -
3 -1,12 % 3 -2,37 % -1,82 % -1,97 % -
4 -0,14 % 4 -2,51 % -1,95 % - -
5 0,18 % 5 -2,33 % -1,78 % - -
-2,33 % -1,78 % -1,97 % -0,96 %
EVENT STUDY - MORE CORRUPT FIRMS
Event window
Total CAARt
Event window CAARt T-Test BMP-test Sign-test Ratio of negative events
[-5, 5] -0,64 % -0,598 -0,424 0,000 0,500
[-3, 3] -1,36 % -1,630 -1,670 * -1,372 0,588
[-1, 1] -0,84 % -1,315 -1,246 -0,686 0,559
[-1, 5] -0,35 % -0,493 -0,422 0,000 0,500
Number of firms 34 34 34 34
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
RESULTS - LESS CORRUPT GROUP
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Table A.5 - Results from event study on more corrupt group 
 
Figure B.1 - Illustration of AARt and CAARt for less corrupt group 
 
Figure B.2 - Illustration of AARt and CAARt for more corrupt group 
Event window CAARt T-Test BMP-test Sign-test Ratio of negative events
[-5, 5] -2,33 % -1,927 * -2,035 ** -1,480 0,622
[-3, 3] -1,97 % -1,907 * -1,937 * -0,493 0,541
[-1, 1] -0,96 % -1,143 -0,932 -0,822 0,568
[-1, 5] -1,78 % -1,593 -1,954 * -1,480 0,622
Number of firms 37 37 37 37
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
RESULTS - MORE CORRUPT GROUP
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Figure B.3 - Illustration of CAAR [-5, 5] for less corrupt and more-corrupt group compared to full sample 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A detailed table of the firms in our data sample is listed on the next two pages. 
Table C.1 – Complete list of firms from dataset 
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